This paper re-examines executive incentive compensation, using a principal-agent model in which the principal is downside risk averse, or prudent (as a number of empirical facts, regulations and scholarly works suggest it should be), instead of risk neutral (as it has been commonly assumed so far in the literature). We …nd that optimal incentive pay should then be 'approximately concave' in performance (in a precise sense), the approximation being closer the more prudent the principal is relative to the agent. This means that an executive should face higher-powered incentives while in the bad states, but be given somewhat weaker incentives when things are going well. Such a statement runs counter to current evidence that incentive compensation packages often put substantial weight on convex devices (such as stock options). We show that this disparity can be justi…ed under certain limited liability and taxation regimes. Some empirical research directions (investigating the composition of incentive pay, notably) and public policy implications are brie ‡y discussed.
Introduction
The 2008 …nancial crisis has put again the spotlight on executive pay. One highlighted feature is the increasing convexi…cation over the past decades -through the more and more widespread use of call options, notably -of the pay-performance relationship in incentive packages: in other words, managerial rewards have generally become very responsive to upside gains but relatively immune to poor results.
This asymmetry is now being questioned by several scholars (see, e.g., Yermack 1995; Jensen and Murphy 2004 ; Murphy and Jensen 2011; Boyer 2011 ). In its January 2011 report, the National Commission in charge of investigating the causes of the …nancial and economic downturn maintained that:
Compensation systems -designed in an environment of cheap money, intense competition, and light regulation -too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain -without considerations of long-term consequences. Often those systems encouraged the big bet -where the payo¤ on the upside could be huge and the downside limited. This was the case up and down the line -from the corporate boardroom to the mortgage broker on the street. (emphasis added) 1 One might impute this state of a¤airs to managerial power (Finkelstein 1992 Kaplan 2012) . In this paper, we reconsider the main framework to deal with executive compensation -the principal-agent model. 2 The 'principal'in this context stands for the corporate board, which is chie ‡y responsible in setting top executives'compensation. 3 It has been commonly viewed so far as being risk-neutral -making gains and losses bearing the same magnitude and probability cancel. This assumption can be debated on at least three grounds. First, since Roy (1952) and Markowitz (1959) , a number of economists have contended 1 As far as CEO (not traders) compensation is concerned, this assertion has now been quali…ed (see, e.g., Murphy 2012).
Whether and when convex incentive schemes are appropriate remains, however, a fundamental issue. Conyon and Peck (2012). 3 Although the corporate board is itself an agent of shareholders, Conyon and Peck (2012, p. 464), among many others, point out that: "Clearly, shareholders do not set pay: they are too numerous and too diverse. In reality the board of directors sets pay."
that investors react asymmetrically to gains and losses. Corroborating this, Harvey and Siddique (2000), Ang et al. (2006) , and others report that stock returns do re ‡ect a premium for bearing downside risk.
A corporate board acting in the best interest of shareholders would likely take this into account. Second, in assessing and disclosing their …rm's prospects, corporate boards often display 'conservatism'(see, e.g., . 5 Directors and o¢ cers should accordingly "(...) exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence which an ordinary, prudent man would exercise in the management of his own a¤airs." (Clark 1985 , p. 73; emphasis added). This requirement should drive corporate boards to weigh di¤erently the risks correlated with downside losses versus those linked to upside gains. Such behavior is inconsistent again with risk neutrality, so one might sensibly cast doubt on some of the prescriptions from current and past principal-agent analyses of incentive pay.
In what follows, we now examine executive compensation using a principal-agent model in which the principal is 'prudent,' in the sense introduced in economics by Kimball (1990) . This indeed portrays the principal as a downside risk averse entity. 6 A prudent decision maker dislikes mean and variance- 4 As the reader will see in the upcoming sections, this paper draws further from this literature. It supports one of our key modelling assumptions (Section 2). It also suggests ways to empirically characterize more or less prudent boards (Section 6). whoever is relatively more prudent should bear less downside risk. Convex incentives, being very sensitive to performance in upbeat situations and rather ‡at in the range where results are mediocre, shelter a prudent agent against downside volatility which must then be born by the principal. Concave incentives, by contrast, reward performance improvements much more strongly under adverse circumstances and make the agent bear signi…cant downside risk; a prudent principal thereby decreases her own exposure to downside risk by …rmly pushing her agent to get away from dangerous territory.
Whether the principal is more or less prudent relative to the agent should therefore be an important practical matter in setting optimal compensation contracts. Yet, the principal's prudence does not seem to matter much so far in most industries. According to Garvey and Milbourn (2006, p. 198) , "(...) the average executive loses 25-45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck."According to Core and Guay (2010), CEO annual pay falls by about 13.7% in the lowest decile and increases by about 19.7%
in the highest decile. In other words, convex executive contracts are quite common, owing notably to the widespread use of stock options (see, e.g., Hall and Murphy 2003) and performance shares (Equilar 2012 a and b). 8 We argue below that this can be justi…ed under some common government policies such as 7 Empirical evidence that executives are prudent can be found in McAnally et al (2011), Garvey and Milbourn (2006) , and the references therein. 8 Notable exceptions are …rms in the utility sector (Murphy 1999) and 'socially responsible' …rms (Frye and al. 2006) , where the pay-performance relation actually tends to be concave. In this context, regulation and public pressure can be limited liability and progressive taxation. 9 In cases where the agent/executive cannot be in ‡icted negative revenues or the principal/corporation can be refunded when net pro…ts are negative (which can be seen as a rough proxy for the 2008 TARP -Trouble Asset Relief Program -rescue of …nancial institutions), approximately concave contracts are no longer optimal even if the principal is very prudent. A similar conclusion holds when the principal's pro…ts are taxed (which corresponds to a British government's proposal concerning banks' pro…ts). When executive income is subject to progressive taxation (which roughly reproduces suggestions actively debated in the U.S. and implemented in France), the upshot is even more radical: a prudent principal might squarely o¤er strictly convex rewards in order to circumvent the e¤ect of taxation and properly encourage the agent to pursue the better states of nature.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model -a static principalagent model where the agent is e¤ort and risk averse while the principal is both risk averse and prudent;
we ensure throughout that the …rst-order approach is valid, using only some of the assumptions in Jewitt (1988). Our central result -that the optimal contract should in that case be approximately concave, thereby seeking a balance between the agent's and the principal's respective prudence -is established in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 then show how limited liability and taxation can respectively produce deviations from this prescription. Section 6 next explores some avenues for empirical research. An important upshot, for instance, is that our …ndings about approximate concavity can be seen as making predictions on the composition of pay: indeed, one mean to measure approximate concavity is the relative weight an incentive package gives to convex (e.g., call options) versus concave (e.g., capped bonuses) incentives. Section 7, …nally, contains concluding remarks and some policy observations. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The benchmark model
Consider an agent -standing for a CEO or a top executive -whose preferences can be represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u( ) de…ned over monetary payments. We assume this function is three-times di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave, formally u 0 ( ) > 0 and u 00 ( ) < 0, so the agent is risk averse.
This agent can work for a principal -in this case, a corporate board acting for a given companywhose preferences are represented by the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function v( ) de…ned over net suspected to add to …duciary duties to ultimately make corporate boards quite prudent. Kimball (1990) . It can be checked that prudence (i.e. a utility function with positive third derivative) is a necessary condition for absolute risk aversion to decrease with wealth. To …x intuition further about the notion of prudence, consider the following examples.
In the …rst one, two decision makers with respective (quadratic) utility functions u 1 (w) = 70w w 2 and u 2 (w) = 100w w 2 contemplate lotteries X = (0; 2; 1=4; 3=4) and Y = (1; 3; 3=4; 1=4), where the …rst two arguments are prizes and the last two their respective probabilities (lottery X, for instance, yields prize 0 with probability 1=4). According to the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient, the …rst decision maker is more risk averse since R u1 = 2 70 2w and R u2 = 2 100 2w . The two lotteries have the same mean and variance, but they exhibit di¤erent skewness. Yet, we have that In the …rst one, a prize equal to 3 obtains with probability 1=2 or a sublottery is played with probability 1=2 that yields prizes 0 or 2 with equal probability. In the second one, a prize equal to 1 obtains with probability 1=2 or a sublottery is played with probability 1=2 that yields prizes 2 or 4 with equal probability.
Again, both lotteries have the same mean and variance. But a prudent -or downside risk averse -decision maker will prefer lottery B over lottery A, because in the former (the latter) the occurrence of a sublottery -or additional volatility -happens when the stakes are relatively good (bad). Now, let the principal's pro…t depend stochastically on the agent's e¤ort level a. The latter cannot be observed, however, and the agent incurs a cost of e¤ort c(a) that is increasing and convex (c 0 (a) > 0 and c 00 (a) 0). The principal only gets a veri…able signal s, drawn from a compact subset S = [s ; s] of R, which is positively correlated with the agent's e¤ort a through the conditional probability distribution F (s; a) with density f (s; a) strictly positive on S. Based on observing s, she can infer a realized pro…t (s), which we suppose increasing and concave or linear in s ( 0 (s) > 0 and 00 (s) 0), and pays the agent a compensation. To …x intuition, one may think of s as a sales forecast; if the …rm has some market power, then it is reasonable to expect pro…t to be concave in output, hence in sales. 10 Alternatively, s might be the …rm's stock market value and (s) a conservative assessment of the …rm's net assets. The principal's problem is to …nd a smooth reward schedule or incentive scheme w(s) that maximizes pro…t, under the constraints that the agent will maximize his own expected utility (the incentive compatibility constraint) and must receive an expected payo¤ that is not inferior to some external one U 0 (the participation constraint). This can be written formally as follows:
subject to For tractability reasons, one usually replaces the incentive compatibility constraint by a relaxed constraint based on the …rst-order necessary condition on the agent's utility-maximizing e¤ort a. This transforms the principal's initial problem into the following one: These requirements correspond respectively to assumptions (2.10a), (2.10b) and (2.11) in Jewitt (1988)'s theorem 1. They are satis…ed by many common distributions, such as the Poisson with mean a, the gamma with mean a, and the chi-squared with degree of freedom parameter a. Assumption 3 "(...) suggests that variations in output at higher levels are relatively less useful in providing 'information' on the agent's e¤ort than they are at lower levels of output." (Jewitt 1988 
. If the principal is more prudent than the agent (in the sense of De…nition 1 below), the function !(z) = u(h 1 (z)) is non decreasing and concave in z.
Since the multiplier must be positive at an optimum, by Assumption 3 and Rogerson (1985)'s lemma 5, the validity of the …rst-order approach ensues from Jewitt (1988)'s theorem 1.
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This completes the description of our benchmark model. Let us now proceed to characterize the optimal incentive scheme in this context.
Approximately concave incentive schemes
This section will now establish that a principal who is su¢ ciently prudent compared with the agent (in a sense to be made precise very soon) should set an incentive compensation package that is approximately concave in outcome. The implications of such a contract are discussed below. To begin with, note that the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and su¢ cient conditions require that a solution to program (2) meet the equation:
The multiplier being positive, Assumption 3 entails that the right-hand-side of (3) is increasing and concave in the signal s. This allows to state the following. Lemma 2 The optimal reward schedule w (s) is increasing in the performance signal s.
The proof consists in taking the …rst derivative of the left-hand-side of expression (3), knowing it must be positive. Similarly taking the second derivative, which must in turn be negative, will yield the central result of this section. Beforehand, we need to de…ne two key items.
The …rst one concerns the principal's and the agent's relative prudence. Observe that 13
for some real number k 1 and 8s, the principal is said to be more prudent than the agent by a factor k.
We next borrow from the litterature on approximately concave functions (Hyers and Ulam 1952; Páles 2003).
De…nition 2 If I is a subinterval of the real line R and ; are nonnegative numbers, a function g :
Clearly, the function g is concave when = = 0. The literature uses the term -concave when = 0 < .
The following characterization, which combines Páles (2003)'s theorems 3 and 4, will help visualize better the case where > 0 = , which is the relevant one in this paper.
Lemma 3 Let I be a subinterval of the real line R and a nonnegative number. A function g : I ! R is ( ; 0)-concave at x 2 I if and only if there exists a non-increasing function q : I ! R such that
The function q in Lemma 3 bears a close resemblance to a subgradient, and the literature indeed says that g is ( ; 0)-subdi¤ erentiable when such a function exists. If the lemma holds on each subinterval of the entire domain of the function g, then g's graph might look like the one shown in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Our main result is now at hand. 1 3 A somewhat di¤erent measure is the 'index of downside risk aversion'Sv = dv 3 2 R 2 v due to Keenan and Snow (2005) . This index does not have the properties dv has, but it recalls the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion in the sense that its value increases under monotonic downside risk averse transformations of the utility function v.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the principal is more prudent than the agent by a factor k. Then the optimal wage schedule w (s) is ( (k); 0)-concave at any s 2 S, where the number (k) decreases with k and tends to 0 as k grows.
The proof shows, actually, that convergence to concavity is not asymptotic: when
k , i.e. the CEO's earnings do not grow too fast with respect to the …rm's net pro…t, then we must have (k) = 0 so w (s) concave at s. Meanwhile, moreover, the ( (k); 0)-subgradient of the wage schedule w (s) will be the derivative 0 (s) of the pro…t function, so the CEO's incentives will remain well-aligned on the …rm's interest.
The theorem's conclusion holds vacuously -hence the optimal incentive scheme is concave -when the agent is not prudent (for u 000 0, hence d u 0, in this case). If the agent is prudent (i.e. u 000 > 0), the theorem says that he may still have to bear more downside risk when the principal exhibits enough local prudence. In this case, incentive compensation will be approximately concave, so generally more responsive to performance under unfavorable than under positive circumstances. By o¤ering such a contract, the prudent principal motivates the agent to keep away from, not only the bad, but indeed the very bad outcomes. would make non-concave incentive schemes optimal. In the following sections, we successively examine two sets of reasons which, when added to the benchmark model, might indeed justify why pay-performance concavity should not be that frequent. 1 4 We don't mean to say here that pay-performance concavity renders the agent less eager to take risks. As Ross (2004, p.
209-211) pointed out, the overall e¤ect of an incentive scheme w(s) compared to an alternative z(s) on the agent's behavior towards risk depends on whether the utility function u(w(s)) displays more or less risk aversion than the utility function u(z(s)). Suppose, for instance, that the latter scheme takes the form of a call option (a convex contract) z(s) = max fs r; 0g with r the exercise price, while the former is the put option (a concave contract) w(s) = min fb r + s; bg with b a …xed fee and r the exercise price. An agent whose risk aversion decreases with wealth (prudence is a necessary condition for this)
will then be less locally risk averse at the exercise price r under contract w( ) than under contract z( ).
Limited liability and non-concavity
As a …rst departure from our benchmark model, let's allow either the agent or the principal to bear limited losses. In the …rst subsection, the agent will always earn nonnegative revenue. In the second subsection, the principal will be rescued whenever net pro…ts are falling below zero.
The judgment-proof agent
Suppose the agent's revenue is bounded from below, so he cannot bear very high penalties when performance is bad. Management remuneration is frequently subject to this type of constraint. 15 An agent with limited wealth, for instance, can …le for bankruptcy if he cannot a¤ord paying some penalty. 
where (s) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the nonnegative wage constraint in state s.
Let a 1 denote the agent's new choice of e¤ort (to be soon compared with a , the agent's optimal e¤ort in the benchmark model). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to this problem (4) lead this time to the equation:
with (s)w(s) = 0 at all s.
Let s 1 be the signal value for which a zero wage is optimal. Since the reward function is increasing on the positive subspace, this signal is unique. Take the two subsets
and let w 1 (s) be the optimal reward function. Some extra computations based on (5) lead to the following statement.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the principal is more prudent than the agent by a factor k. If the agent is protected by limited liability, then:
a) The optimal wage schedule is such that (i) w 1 (s) = 0 for any signal s lower than some threshold give relatively more weight to capped bonuses than stock options. The agent being fully protected on the downside, the principal can indeed save on o¤ering potentially expensive rewards on the upside.
The sheltered principal
Consider now a situation where it is the principal's losses which are limited. Many countries actually possess, implicitly or explicitly, rescue programs aimed at supporting their so-called 'strategic'or 'too big to fail'enterprises when they are on the verge of collapse. In 2008, for example, at the heart of the …nancial crisis, the United States government -under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) -purchased hundreds of billions of dollars in assets and equity from distressed …nancial institutions. In 2004, the engineering and manufacturing company Alstom, which had experienced a string of business disasters, received 2.5 billion euros in rescue money from the French government (as part of a plan previously approved by the European Commission). Such state interventions usually raise concerns that they will fuel moral hazard from the sheltered …rms. As we shall see, they might at …rst have an e¤ect on the incentives of senior executives and CEOs.
Suppose there is a state of nature s 2 in which (s 2 ) = 0; pro…ts being increasing in s by assumption,
we have that (s) < 0 when s < s 2 and (s) 0 for s s 2 . We postulate that the principal will be rescued after she has compensated the agent. 17 Recall that jw(s)j < j (s)j for any s 2 S; net pro…ts (s) w(s) remain therefore positive for s > s 2 , equal to zero at s = s 2 and negative when s < s 2 .
Consider now the two subsets:
A sheltered principal must then solve the following problem:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions applied to this problem give rise to two distinct expressions. That is:
and
Condition (7) is the same as in the benchmark case while condition (8) entails a constant ‡oor wage. The optimal incentive scheme is thus similar, on the upside, to the one prescribed in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the principal is more prudent than the agent by a factor k. If net pro…ts are prevented to fall below zero, then:
a) The optimal wage schedule is such that (i) w 2 (s) = w 2 (s 2 ) = 0 for all adverse signals s 2 S 2 , and (ii) w 2 (s) is ( 2 (k); 0)-concave on S 2 = S n S 2 , where the number 2 (k) decreases with k and tends to 0 as k grows.
b) The incentive shceme w 2 (s) is less approximately concave on the subset S 2 than the one w (s) in Theorem 1. In other words, 2 (k) < (k) for any given k.
as the CEO also bene…ts from the …rm's rescue when pro…ts (s) turn negative. This allows again the principal to save on costly upside payments, so the pay-performance relationship should approach concavity more closely on the upside.
These prescriptions may not coincide with the prevailing practices of some industries (investment banking, notably). We shall now examine whether taxation can better support the evidence.
Taxation and convexity
The second departure from our benchmark model is to introduce personal and corporate taxes. Tax In what follows, we investigate the rami…cations such proposals could have for the agent's incentive scheme. 18 
Income taxation
Assume that the agent has to pay a tax when her income is positive, the tax rate being positive and nondecreasing in the agent's revenue. Such progressive taxation exists in several countries. In the United States, for example, the e¤ective tax rate for revenues around $266,000 is 20.1%, while it is 20.9%
for incomes around $610,000. 19 In the Netherlands, the …rst 200,000 euros of taxable income are subject to a tax rate of 20%, and the rate on further income is 25,5%. Meanwhile, France's president François The US Congressional Budget O¢ ce calculates e¤ective tax rates by dividing taxes paid with comprehensive household income. The latter "equals pretax cash income plus income from other sources. Pretax cash income is the sum of wages, salaries, self-employment income, rents, taxable and nontaxable interest, dividends, realized capital gains, cash transfer payments, and retirement bene…ts (...). Other sources of income include all in-kind bene…ts (Medicare, Medicaid, employerpaid health insurance premiums, food stamps, school lunches and breakfasts, housing assistance, and energy assistance)." larger than one million euros.
Since the agent's payo¤ grows with the signal s, let us then write the tax rate as a function (s) of s with 0 (s) 0 at all s where w(s) > 0. To keep matters simple, we suppose that 00 (s) = 0. Using the notation S 3 = fs 2 S; w(s) > 0g and S 3 = fs 2 S; w(s) 0g, the optimal incentive scheme must now solve the following problem:
subject to R
The …rst-order conditions are then given by:
Taking the …rst and second derivatives of the left-hand side of the latter expressions leads to a perhaps surprising (albeit intuitive) conclusion.
Proposition 3
Assume that the principal is more prudent than the agent by a factor k, that a nondecreasing linear tax rate (s) applies to the agent's positive income, and that the agent's net income (1 (s))w(s) is nondecreasing in s. Then:
(i) When the agent is risk neutral and the tax rate is constant, the optimal wage schedule is concave at any state s in S.
(ii) When the agent is risk-averse, the principal being more prudent than the agent by a factor k no longer su¢ ces to make the optimal wage schedule approximately-concave on S.
This proposition compares a situation with (i) a constant tax rate to another (ii) where it is progressive.
Each …scal policy has of course a speci…c impact on the agent's behavior and a¤ects therefore the optimal compensation scheme set by the principal. In the former case ( 0 (s) = 0), the principal's prudence prevails and the pay-performance relationship remains concave when the agent is risk neutral. For any remuneration package, however, an increasing tax function ( 0 (s) > 0) weakens more and more the agent's incentives as his e¤orts yield better results. This might induce even a principal that is a lot more prudent than the agent to …nd approximately concave incentive pay inappropriate and o¤er instead a reward function that becomes steeper as s goes up. Progressive taxation might thus bring about convex reward schemes, despite the fact that the principal is prudent, and despite the often-explicit intent of such …scal policy to curb executive revenues. 20 
Pro…t taxation
Suppose now that the principal's positive net pro…t is subject to a constant tax rate . An optimal incentive scheme must then solve:
where S 4 = fs 2 S; (s) w(s) 0g and S 4 = fs 2 S; (s) w(s) < 0g.
The …rst-order conditions in this case are given by:
The principal's and the agent's relative prudence, measured by the factor k, will now have to be considered with respect to a given taxation policy. Proceeding as before yields our last result.
Proposition 4
Assume that the principal is more prudent than the agent by a factor k, and that a constant tax rate applies to the principal's net pro…t when it is positive. Then:
(i) the optimal wage schedule is ( 4 (k); 0)-concave when net pro…ts are negative, where the number 4 (k) gets smaller with k and tends to 0 as k grows; (ii) the optimal wage schedule is ( 4 (k; ); 0)-concave when net pro…ts are positive, where the number 4 (k; ) gets smaller with k and tends to 0 as k grows; (iii) 4 (k; ) increases with , so the higher the tax rate on corporate pro…ts the cruder the payperformance concavity. When corporate pro…ts are taxed, in sum, a prudent board might nevertheless prefer to grant the CEO more and more revenue as the …rm's performance gets better and better, especially if this motivates him further without changing the expected tax bill by much.
With these …nal remarks, Section 5 is now complete. Although the above propositions were set to be normative statements, they can also be seen as making a number of testable empirical predictions.
To make this clearer, the next section will brie ‡y look at how certain key notions such as approximately concave incentive wages and prudent boards might be used by empiricists.
Empirical rami…cations
This paper's main theorem and four propositions relate a corporate board's relative prudence to how well the resulting incentive scheme will approximate a concave function.
A natural way to assess the approximate concavity of a CEO's pay with respect to performance would be to check the relative weight the actual incentive package gives to capped bonuses and similar concave devices, compared to other means like call options that tend to convexify remuneration.
To estimate a board's prudence, one might draw from the empirical literature on accounting conservatism. As we argued in the introduction, conservatism is akin to prudence. 21 Factors that drive conservative practices could then be seen as proxies for a board's degree of prudence. What matters, however, is not only whether the board is prudent but also (and more importantly)
how much more prudent it is than the CEO. This can in turn be captured by gauging the in ‡uence the CEO has on the board (higher CEO turnover, for instance, will indicate less in ‡uence, but whether the same person holds both the CEO and chairman of the board titles would signal the opposite). The greater the CEO's power, the lower the factor k in the above theorem and propositions, so the more incentive pay could depart from real concavity. When the principal is prudent, the optimal contract trades o¤ downside risk and incentives. An approximately concave incentive scheme clearly shifts some downside risk upon the agent, as remuneration follows the pattern shown in Figure 1 and is on the whole more sensitive to improved performance at the lower levels than across the highpoints. By doing so, a prudent principal increases the agent's motivation to keep the …rm away from the worst.
Interestingly, several government policies that were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008 …nancial debacle can be viewed as surrogates for having prudent corporate boards. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States, for instance, contains three key measures to 'concavify' the incentive compensation of CEOs and top executives. 23 First, empirical work so far suggests that providing shareholders with a regular vote on pay, as the 'Say-on-Pay'clause does, is likely to increase the sensitivity of CEO remuneration to poor accounting performance (see Ferri and Maber 2013) . Second, mandatory 'hedging policies'-which ask companies to disclose whether or not employees or directors are allowed to use …nancial instruments to o¤set a fall in the market value of equity securities granted as compensation -will certainly deter some means to avoid downside risk which would otherwise tend to 'convexify' the pay-performance relationship (as shown in subsection 4.1 above). Third, asking …rms to both disclose total payments made to the CEO and the median of overall compensation awarded to all employees may well put an implicit cap on the growth rate of CEO rewards. To see if this truly happens is left to future empirical work, of course, and the above Section 6 makes suggestions on how this could be done. Whether such regulations are more e¤ective and e¢ cient than fostering …duciary duties and good governance in the …rst place also remains to be seen. 24 To be sure, however, not all public policies that preceded or followed …nancial crises have been supportive of exposing CEOs to more downside risk. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the 1993
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in the U.S., for instance, which made CEO gains above $1 million non-deductible if not performance-based, is well-known to have encouraged companies to 'convexify'incentive pay by granting more stock options (Murphy 2011 ). As Proposition 2 shows, …rm rescue programs such as TARP tend similarly to support sheltering CEOs from downside risk. Proposition 3's prescription, …nally, suggests that bee…ng up the tax rate on high incomes, as put forward by the French government, may well lead even prudent corporate boards to go for convex incentive schemes. be clear whose risk preferences should be taken into account after all. The choice of an incentive scheme is furthermore subject to other criteria, such as attracting and retaining talented people. This paper thus represents only one additional step towards building a complete, integrated and operational normative framework for the design of executive incentive contracts.
APPENDIX Proof of Lemma 1.
We want to show that
. By the Chain Rule:
The latter term is certainly negative if d v > d u , i.e. as long as the principal is more prudent than the agent in the sense of De…nition 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.
of crisis, the upshot will be to restore the incentive structure that might have contributed to the pre-2008 …nancial bubble.
Risk aversion of at least one player is su¢ cient to obtain that w 0 (s) 0. Indeed we have, with v( (s) w(s)) denoted as v( ) and u(w(s)) denoted as u( ):
The latter must be positive, by Assumption 3, in order to satisfy equation (3) . A necessary condition for this is w 0 (s) 0.
Proof of the theorem.
Let us now compute the second derivative of the left-hand side term in equation (3). Assumption 1 entails it must be negative. 
The last term here is in fact
, and it is positive by Lemma 2. Then:
The sign of this last expression depends on the sign of (
and it is then necessary that w 00 (s) < 0 so w is concave at s, or
Recall that the derivatives w 
For all x 2 S; x 6 = s; then:
Because w 0 (s) < M and w 0 (s) > 0 from Lemma 2, we have:
Now, since w is di¤erentiable at s, we have (by de…nition) that
with the residual r(x) such that lim x!s r(x)
x s = 0. The last inequality entails that
if x is su¢ ciently close to s. Since 0 (s) is decreasing in s by assumption, the latter and Lemma 3 mean that w(s) is ( (k); 0)-concave on a subinterval of S that contains s. Since this is to be true at any point s, keeping the same number (k), then w (s) is ( (k); 0)-concave on S.
Proof of Proposition 1.
For any state s in S 1 , we have (s) = 0 and, following the proof of the theorem, the optimal reward function is increasing and ( 1 (k) 0)-concave with 1 (k) de…ned below.
Besides, the limited liability constraint is binding for any signal s in S 1 . This proves a).
To show b), let M 0 = max Di \ S1 6 = ?
M i on the neighborhoods D i having a nonempty intersection with
From the proof of the theorem, we have
Proof of Proposition 2.
The Lagrangian function for this problem is given by
Two expressions must be considered when verifying the …rst-order conditions for maximizing L . If s 2 S 2 ,
and, in particular,
For s 2 S 2 , we have
To Expression (16) , one can apply the reasoning used in the proof of the theorem. Thus, the optimal reward function is ( 2 (k); 0)-concave on S 2 . This is point (ii) in a).
For point i), notice that, from (17) 
f (s;a) , this implies that
The Lagrangian function L being concave in w(s) on ]b s; s 2 [ and convex otherwise, the optimal revenue is the maximum possible one for any s s 2 . More precisely, w(s) being continuous and increasing on S 2 , the reward schedule satis…es w 2 (s) = w 2 (s 2 ) = (s 2 ) = 0 for any s s 2 . This is point (i).in a).
Finally, we can apply the reasoning of the proof of Point b) of Proposition 1 in order to show that 2 (k) < (k) for any given k.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider condition (10) . Let A = @ @s ((1 (s))w(s)), which is assumed to be positive. We have that
. With 00 = 0 by assumption, the latter simpli…es to
Note that A 0 = (1 )w 00 2 0 w 0 . The latter expression becomes
The …rst term in line (21) , namely 00 v 00 , is positive by assumption. The sign of the second term depends on the sign of w 00 . Lines (22) and (23) now remain to be signed. The sum of these lines can be written:
With R 
If the Agent is risk neutral (R u = 0), and the tax rate is constant ( 0 (s) = 8s), the latter reduces to
In this case, the sign of By assumption, the net revenue of the agent is non decreasing, which implies that 0 < < 1. 
where
. We must analyze the sign of the three components in the brackets in Equation (27) . With C = As for the proof of the theorem, two cases are possible. Either It can also be written 0 (s) w 0 (s)
In the latter situation, let M 00 = max Di \ S4 6 = ?
M i , and take 4 (k; ) > 0 so that
The latter inequality is equivalent to
For all x 2 S 4 ; x 6 = s; then: 
